Georgia debt defense
Last updated May 2026
If a debt collector, debt buyer, or creditor sued you in Georgia, the first job is to identify your court, calendar the Answer deadline, and respond before default. This guide explains Georgia debt lawsuit deadlines, common proof issues, and how Answered helps you prepare a self-help Answer Packet for supported cases.
You have 30 days to respond.
Answer Packet $60. Full Defense $99. Document Review $99 where available.
Orientation
Somebody has filed a lawsuit against you in a Georgia court alleging that you owe money on a consumer debt. The packet in your hand is a Summons (the order to respond) plus a Complaint (the document explaining what they are suing you for, with attached exhibits). Georgia runs a three-tier trial-court structure, and which tier your case is in determines the procedural rulebook and the governing Answer-deadline statute. Magistrate Court handles cases up to $15,000 under the simplified Magistrate Court Rules and O.C.G.A. § 15-10-40 et seq.; the 30-day Answer deadline in Magistrate Court is governed by O.C.G.A. § 15-10-43(a). State Court (in counties that have one) and Superior Court handle larger cases under the full Georgia Civil Practice Act; the 30-day Answer deadline in those tracks is governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(a). The 30-day window itself is the same across tiers; the governing statute differs. Most consumer-debt cases land in Magistrate Court because the typical credit-card balance is below the $15,000 cap.
One tier-specific safety net: in State Court and Superior Court cases (the Civil Practice Act tracks), O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a) provides a 45-day total window from service: 30 days to file your Answer, and if you miss that deadline, an additional 15-day window (days 31–45) during which the default may be opened "as a matter of right" by filing the Answer and paying costs — no judicial discretion, no meritorious-defense showing required. The § 9-11-55(a) 45-day filing window does NOT apply in Magistrate Court because § 9-11-55 is a Civil Practice Act rule and the Civil Practice Act does not govern Magistrate Court. Most Georgia consumer-debt cases are in Magistrate Court (per the $15K cap), so the 45-day-effective-window framing is a State/Superior feature available to the minority of cases, not a universal Georgia debt-defense rule. Magistrate-tier defendants face a hard 30-day deadline.
Your deadline
The deadline rule is tier-specific in Georgia, and the second-stage filing-window extension only applies to two of the three tiers — the rule most defendants do not know about. The 30-day window is uniform across tiers, but the governing statute and the default-cure procedure differ. In Magistrate Court (cases up to $15,000), file an Answer within 30 days of service under O.C.G.A. § 15-10-43(a). In State Court and Superior Court (cases above $15,000 or in counties without a State Court), file an Answer within 30 days of service under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(a) of the Georgia Civil Practice Act. Calendar days, not business days; the clock runs from the day after service under O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(d)(3); if Day 30 falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the deadline rolls to the next business day. Service can be personal (sheriff, marshal, or licensed process server hands you the papers), substituted (left with someone of suitable age at your residence under § 9-11-4(d)(7) for CPA tracks and the parallel Magistrate Court Rules for the Magistrate track), or by registered/certified mail under specific circumstances. The proof of service in the court file specifies which method was used and the date.
The § 9-11-55(a) 45-day filing window — STATE AND SUPERIOR COURT ONLY. In State and Superior Court cases (the Civil Practice Act tracks), O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a) provides a 45-day total window from service: 30 days to file your Answer, and if you miss that deadline, an additional 15-day window (days 31–45 from service) during which you may open the default as a matter of right by simply paying any accrued court costs. Three words do all the work: "as a matter of right." There is no judicial discretion. The court must accept the late-filed Answer if it is filed within 15 days of default and accompanied by payment of costs. No good-cause showing. No meritorious-defense showing. After Day 45 in a CPA-track case, the procedural posture shifts to the discretionary § 9-11-55(b) standard (providential cause OR excusable neglect, AND a meritorious defense, AND reasonable time) — much harder, and Georgia trial courts deny pro se § 9-11-55(b) motions at substantial rates.
Magistrate Court is different. The Civil Practice Act does not govern Magistrate Court (Magistrate Court operates under § 15-10-40 et seq. and the Magistrate Court Rules), so § 9-11-55(a) and § 9-11-55(b) do not apply there. In Magistrate Court, the 30-day Answer deadline under § 15-10-43(a) is a hard deadline; default judgment can enter after Day 30 without the Civil Practice Act grace mechanism.
What default judgment looks like in Georgia. After the applicable default-cure windows close (whichever tier), the court enters judgment for the alleged amount plus court costs and statutory post-judgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12. The plaintiff can serve a writ of garnishment for wages under § 18-4-5 (capped at the federal floor — 25% of disposable earnings or the amount over 30× federal minimum wage; same cap most states use, weaker than Texas's constitutional categorical bar and weaker than New York's 10%-of-gross cap), levy bank accounts under § 18-4-3, and docket the judgment as a lien on real property under § 9-12-86. Safer filing practice: file by Day 25 if at all possible regardless of tier. In State/Superior Court, the § 9-11-55(a) additional 15-day window is a backstop, not a plan. In Magistrate Court, there is no backstop.
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The court system
Georgia has a three-tier trial-court structure for civil cases. Magistrate Court handles cases up to $15,000 under O.C.G.A. § 15-10-2(5) and operates under the simplified Magistrate Court Rules and § 15-10-40 et seq. The procedural rulebook is genuinely accessible to self-represented defendants — pleadings are simpler, motions are streamlined, and Magistrate Court Judges handle a high volume of pro se litigation as the ordinary course. Counterclaims are permitted but capped at the $15,000 jurisdictional limit. Discovery is permitted under Magistrate Court Rule 41 but practically more limited than the full Civil Practice Act framework. Most Georgia consumer-debt cases — credit-card debt-buyer suits, medical-debt suits, smaller original-creditor cases — land in Magistrate Court because the typical balance is below $15,000.
State Court exists in some Georgia counties but not all. Where it exists, State Court has concurrent civil jurisdiction with Superior Court and applies the full Georgia Civil Practice Act with formal motion practice under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-7 et seq. and full discovery under § 9-11-26 et seq. Where State Court does not exist, cases above the Magistrate cap go directly to Superior Court. Superior Court is the trial court of general civil jurisdiction with no upper limit on amount in controversy. Both State Court and Superior Court apply the same Civil Practice Act framework.
The key distinction for your defense and the governing-statute split: Magistrate Court runs on its own procedural rulebook with the 30-day Answer deadline under O.C.G.A. § 15-10-43(a); the Civil Practice Act's § 9-11-12(a) governs the parallel 30-day deadline in State and Superior Court. The 30-day window itself is the same; the statutes differ. The Civil Practice Act's § 9-11-55(a) 45-day filing window (additional 15-day as-of-right window, days 31–45 from service) operates in State and Superior Court tracks ONLY — it does not apply in Magistrate Court because the Civil Practice Act does not govern that tier. Pro se defendants can mount Nyankojo/Wirth chain-of-title defenses and raise SOL affirmative defenses under § 9-3-24 / § 9-3-25 in any tier, but the procedural-runway difference is material: a missed Magistrate Court deadline has no built-in grace mechanism. The case caption on the summons specifies the court — "In the Magistrate Court of [county]," "In the State Court of [county]," or "In the Superior Court of [county]." If you cannot tell, call the clerk's office named on the summons. Filing fees: Magistrate $0-$50, State and Superior $200-$300; in-forma-pauperis fee waivers under § 9-15-2(a) are available for low-income defendants.
Statute of limitations
Georgia’s statute of limitations on debt is 6 years, codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 (with 4-year SOL under § 9-3-25 for open accounts). The clock typically runs from: date of last payment or last charge.
If the time-bar has run, the debt may not be legally collectible in court — but you generally have to raise the defense yourself. It is not raised automatically.
Compare this entry with the national debt lawsuit deadline and statute-of-limitations table.
For the old-debt defense specifically, open the Georgia statute-of-limitations hub entry.
Your rights
The one thing most people miss
Key fact
Georgia has the strongest published debt-buyer chain-of-title doctrine in the country under Nyankojo v. North Star Capital Acquisition, 298 Ga. App. 6 (2009), and Wirth v. CACH, LLC, 300 Ga. App. 488 (2009) — account-level assignment proof that most debt-buyer template pleadings cannot meet. Magistrate Court (cases up to $15,000) handles the bulk of Georgia consumer-debt cases under a hard 30-day Answer deadline under O.C.G.A. § 15-10-43(a); State and Superior Court use the same 30-day deadline under § 9-11-12(a), with a § 9-11-55(a) 45-day effective filing window (days 31–45 as a matter of right) that does NOT apply in Magistrate Court.
The framework
Concise summaries below. Use these as issue-spotting prompts tied to your user-confirmed facts and court papers.
Statute of limitations and the § 9-3-24 / § 9-3-25 split
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 (6-year written contracts); O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 (4-year open accounts / account stated); Hill v. American Express Travel Related Services Co., 250 Ga. App. 565 (2001)
Georgia runs two SOLs on consumer debt — six years on a written contract under § 9-3-24 and four years on an open account or account stated under § 9-3-25. When the debt-buyer plaintiff cannot produce the original signed cardholder agreement, the four-year SOL may become an important issue to preserve and test. The clock typically runs from the date of last payment or last charge; a charge-off does not restart the SOL. REVIVAL under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-112: a signed written acknowledgment of the debt restarts the clock; mere payment alone, without a separate written acknowledgment, generally does not revive a Georgia SOL. Plead both § 9-3-24 and § 9-3-25 in the alternative where appropriate, and request the signed cardholder agreement in discovery under § 9-11-34.
Read the full breakdown →Chain of title under Nyankojo and Wirth
Nyankojo v. North Star Capital Acquisition, 298 Ga. App. 6 (2009); Wirth v. CACH, LLC, 300 Ga. App. 488 (2009)
Georgia has the strongest published debt-buyer chain-of-title doctrine in the country. Both Nyankojo and Wirth are binding Georgia Court of Appeals decisions holding that an assignment must (a) be in writing, (b) identify both assignor and assignee, and (c) AFFIRMATIVELY LINK the specific account by account number. Affidavits alone are insufficient. Generic bills of sale transferring "all accounts owned by Bank X as of [date]" without identifying the defendant's specific account fail. The doctrinal mechanic operates at the proof level — the burden is on the plaintiff to produce account-level documentation, not on the defendant to disprove ownership. Most debt-buyer template pleadings cannot meet the standard, and the doctrine applies uniformly across Magistrate, State, and Superior Court.
Read the full breakdown →Procedural runway: § 9-11-55(a) 45-day filing window (State/Superior Court tracks only)
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a) (Civil Practice Act 45-day filing window, State/Superior only); O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(b) (post-Day-45 discretionary standard); O.C.G.A. § 15-10-43(a) (Magistrate Court 30-day deadline — no Civil-Practice-Act grace mechanism applies)
In State and Superior Court cases (the Civil Practice Act tracks), the § 9-11-55(a) 45-day filing window functions as a procedural defense in itself. After missing Day 30, the defendant retains the right to open default AS A MATTER OF RIGHT through Day 45 by filing the Answer and paying costs. No judicial discretion. No meritorious-defense showing. No good-cause showing. After Day 45, § 9-11-55(b) governs — providential cause or excusable neglect, plus meritorious defense, plus reasonable time, all discretionary. CRITICAL TIER LIMITATION: § 9-11-55 is a Civil Practice Act rule and does NOT apply in Magistrate Court because the Civil Practice Act does not govern that tier. Since most Georgia consumer-debt cases land in Magistrate Court (under the $15K cap), Magistrate-tier defendants face a hard 30-day deadline with no Civil-Practice-Act grace; the 45-day-effective-window framing is a State/Superior feature available to the minority of cases. The 45-day filing window (where applicable) does not change the substantive defenses; Nyankojo/Wirth, SOL, and FDCPA remain available regardless of when you file.
Read the full breakdown →Federal FDCPA counterclaim
15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; § 1692a(6); § 1692e; § 1692k(a)(3)
Federal FDCPA carries more weight in Georgia than in California, Florida, Texas, New York, or Wisconsin because Georgia does not have a state-level FDCPA equivalent that maps cleanly to debt-collection conduct. The Georgia Fair Business Practices Act exists but its debt-collection application is contested and narrower than dedicated state debt-collection statutes elsewhere. § 1692a(6) covers debt buyers (debts acquired in default) per Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, 582 U.S. 79 (2017); § 1692e prohibits false representations; § 1692k provides actual + $1,000 statutory + uncapped federal-court fee-shift under § 1692k(a)(3). Compulsory counterclaim under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13 — claims arising from the same collection transaction generally must be pleaded with the Answer or potentially waived. Stacks with Nyankojo/Wirth standing dismissal — combined exposure typically exceeds the value of the underlying debt.
Read the full breakdown →Why this state
Georgia is one of the more defendant-favorable states in the country at the pleading and standing stages, and the reasons are structural rather than ideological. Three pillars combine to produce that posture — and one of them is tier-specific, which matters because most Georgia consumer-debt cases sit on the tier where that feature does not apply.
First, Nyankojo v. North Star Capital Acquisition, 298 Ga. App. 6 (2009), and Wirth v. CACH, LLC, 300 Ga. App. 488 (2009) — the strongest published debt-buyer chain-of-title doctrine in the country. The standard requires account-level assignment proof for every link in the chain, treats affidavits as insufficient by themselves, and rejects generic portfolio-level bills of sale. Compared to California's FDBPA § 1788.58 (statutory, since 2014), New York's post-CCFA CPLR § 3016(j) (statutory, since 2022), and Texas's Tex. R. Civ. P. 508.2 (procedural rule), Georgia's framework is older case-law doctrine, more thoroughly developed in the published record, and more deeply entrenched. The doctrine operates uniformly across Magistrate, State, and Superior Court — universally available to GA defendants regardless of tier.
Second, Magistrate Court accessibility under O.C.G.A. § 15-10-40 et seq. The simplified Magistrate Court Rules are designed for self-represented practice. The $15,000 jurisdictional cap covers most consumer-debt cases. Pro se defendants can mount Nyankojo/Wirth, SOL, and FDCPA defenses in Magistrate Court without the formal motion practice of higher-tier courts.
Third, the § 9-11-55(a) 45-day filing window (additional 15-day as-of-right extension, days 31–45) in State and Superior Court (Civil Practice Act tracks only). For State/Superior cases, the 30-day Answer deadline is functionally a 45-day window: after Day 30, the default may be opened as a matter of right through Day 45 by filing the Answer and paying costs, with no judicial discretion. No state in this site's registry matches that rule. HONEST FRAMING: § 9-11-55 is a Civil Practice Act rule and does NOT apply in Magistrate Court — so the 45-day-effective-window framing is a feature of the minority of GA consumer-debt cases (those in State/Superior Court), not a universal Georgia rule. Magistrate-tier defendants face a hard 30-day deadline.
The parts of Georgia law that are harder for defendants. No state-level FDCPA equivalent. The Georgia Fair Business Practices Act exists but is narrower in its application to debt-collection conduct than dedicated state debt-collection statutes elsewhere — pre-suit notice requirement under § 10-1-399(b), specific prohibitions oriented to sales-practice misconduct rather than debt-collection conduct, contested case law on how broadly it reaches collection. The federal FDCPA carries the consumer-protection counterclaim load alone in Georgia, which means original-creditor cases (where FDCPA does not apply) have weaker counterclaim leverage. Wage-garnishment protection is federal-floor only under § 18-4-5 — 25% of disposable / 30× federal minimum wage, no state enhancement, weaker than Texas (constitutional categorical bar) or Pennsylvania (head-of-family exemption). Open-border posture — no general collection-agency licensure requirement, so licensure-based defenses are not available. Tillman Group v. Keith, 201 Ga. App. 680 (1991), is a strict arbitration-waiver timing trap — the motion to compel must be filed BEFORE or WITH the Answer, not after, narrower than the federal FAA waiver standard. Bottom line: Georgia is genuinely strong on chain-of-title doctrine, SOL framework, and tier-specific procedural runway (in State/Superior); weaker on consumer-protection counterclaim leverage, post-judgment debtor protections, and Magistrate-tier procedural runway.
Weighing software options? Our Answered vs SoloSuit comparison covers how the two products differ on Nyankojo/Wirth citations in the generated documents, state coverage, document scope, and pricing — relevant in Georgia because the chain-of-title doctrine is where the case-law-citation difference matters most.
Real case
I do not have a Georgia case to cite as my own. The case I won pro se was Plaza Services LLC v. DiSalle, Eau Claire County Case No. 2025SC000885 — a Wisconsin Small Claims action, not a Georgia case. The complaint was the standard debt-buyer template: a thin allegation of breach, a generic affidavit, a chain-of-title summary that named no original creditor with specificity, and a copy of a cardholder agreement attached as an exhibit. The cardholder agreement contained a binding arbitration clause naming the American Arbitration Association as the administering forum.
I filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration under Wisconsin's arbitration framework. The court granted the motion and the dispute moved to AAA administration. Under the AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, the business that wants AAA to administer the arbitration must pay a business filing fee within a specific window. Plaza Services failed to pay the fee. The AAA closed the file for non-compliance. I returned to Eau Claire County and moved to dismiss for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the arbitration procedure they themselves had invoked. On April 9, 2026, Commissioner Johnson dismissed the case without prejudice.
This playbook transfers to Georgia under the Georgia Arbitration Code (O.C.G.A. § 9-9-1 et seq.) and the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3) — but with one critical Georgia-specific timing constraint. Tillman Group v. Keith, 201 Ga. App. 680 (1991), holds that a defendant who litigates the merits before moving to compel arbitration WAIVES arbitration. The motion to compel must be filed BEFORE or WITH the Answer, not after. This is stricter than the federal FAA waiver standard and stricter than the rules in California, New York, Florida, Texas, or Wisconsin. The Wisconsin sequence (Answer first, then Motion to Compel) would be a Tillman waiver in Georgia. The Georgia version of the playbook requires reviewing the cardholder agreement BEFORE drafting the Answer, then filing the Motion to Compel WITH or BEFORE the Answer, and then proceeding through the AAA business-fee abandonment dynamic — which works the same way in Georgia as in Wisconsin because the AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules are national.
The honest framing: this is a transferable playbook with a Georgia-specific timing constraint, not a Georgia outcome. The arbitration clause is not the win; the playbook around enforcing it — combined with the Tillman Group filing-window discipline — is. Answered exists to compress that playbook into a product.
Plaza Services LLC v. DiSalle, Eau Claire County Case No. 2025SC000885 (Wis. Cir. Ct., dismissed without prejudice April 9, 2026).
Action plan
Days 1-2 — Read the summons and complaint. Identify (a) the named plaintiff; (b) the alleged amount; (c) the court tier from the case caption (Magistrate Court ≤$15,000 / State Court / Superior Court); (d) the case number; (e) the date of service from the proof of service in the court file. Calendar the 30-day Answer deadline — governed by O.C.G.A. § 15-10-43(a) in Magistrate Court or by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(a) in State/Superior Court. For State/Superior Court cases, also calendar Day 45 as the close of the § 9-11-55(a) 45-day filing window; for Magistrate Court cases, treat Day 30 as the absolute hard deadline because the § 9-11-55(a) Civil-Practice-Act 45-day filing window does not apply in that tier. Set a working deadline at Day 25 regardless of tier. Examine the cardholder agreement (if attached as an exhibit) for an arbitration clause — if present, the Motion to Compel must be filed WITH or BEFORE the Answer per Tillman Group v. Keith.
Days 3-4 — Do not pay anything to the debt collector. Per O.C.G.A. § 9-3-112, mere payment alone does NOT automatically restart the Georgia SOL — revival requires a separate written acknowledgment of the debt OR a payment entered upon written debt evidence. § 9-3-110 reinforces the writing requirement. The no-payment rule is prudential: confirming receipt or entering a payment plan may create separate legal consequences, and the safest course before assessing your SOL position is no payment. If you have already made an unintended payment or a payment under duress without separate written acknowledgment, the SOL defense is generally preserved if the original limitations period has expired. Identify which defenses apply. Read the complaint for the chain-of-title allegations: if the chain is generic ("Plaintiff is the assignee of the original creditor") without specific account-level identification, Nyankojo and Wirth are in play. Was your last payment more than 4 years ago? § 9-3-25 SOL is in play if the plaintiff cannot produce the signed cardholder agreement. Documented harassment, deception, or false representations? FDCPA counterclaim is in play.
Days 5-10 — Gather records. Pull all three credit reports at AnnualCreditReport.com and find the original creditor name on the tradeline; compare to the plaintiff named on the complaint (almost always different in debt-buyer cases — the gap is your standing defense). Pull every account statement, demand letter, and collection-call log. Run the SOL math under both § 9-3-24 (6-year written contract) and § 9-3-25 (4-year open account). Build the timeline.
Days 11-20 — Draft your Answer. Components: (a) caption matching the complaint exactly with the case number; (b) admit-or-deny each numbered allegation per § 9-11-8(b) — deny anything you cannot personally verify; (c) affirmative defenses under § 9-11-8(c) — SOL under § 9-3-24 written contract OR § 9-3-25 open account in the alternative, lack of standing under Nyankojo and Wirth, failure to state a claim, and the arbitration clause IF the cardholder agreement contains one (and IF so, draft the Motion to Compel Arbitration to file simultaneously to avoid the Tillman waiver); (d) counterclaim under federal FDCPA (15 U.S.C. § 1692e/§ 1692k) for actual + $1,000 statutory + federal-court fees if your plaintiff is a debt buyer or third-party collector; (e) signature block.
Days 21-30 — File. e-file through PeachCourt or eFileGA where the court accepts pro se e-filing, or file in person at the Magistrate / State / Superior Court clerk's office for the county. Pay the filing fee (Magistrate $0-$50; State/Superior $200-$300) or file an affidavit of inability to pay under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-2(a). Mail or e-serve a copy on the plaintiff's attorney with a Certificate of Service under § 9-11-5. Answered does not mail-file Answers in Georgia — you handle the filing yourself.
Days 31-45 — § 9-11-55(a) BACKSTOP (STATE/SUPERIOR COURT ONLY). If your case is in State Court or Superior Court and you missed Day 30, the recovery move is the same Answer plus payment of court costs filed inside the § 9-11-55(a) additional 15-day window (days 31–45). § 9-11-55(a) operates as a matter of right — no good-cause showing, no meritorious-defense showing, no judicial discretion. File at the clerk, pay the costs, the default is open. Address the cost requirement explicitly when filing under § 9-11-55(a) — late filings without addressing costs sometimes get rejected. Do not delay; the longer you wait, the more chance the plaintiff moves for default judgment, which can complicate the procedural posture even though you remain inside the additional 15-day window. After Day 45, the discretionary § 9-11-55(b) standard applies. If your case is in MAGISTRATE COURT and you missed Day 30, there is no Civil-Practice-Act 45-day filing window — § 9-11-55 does not govern Magistrate Court. The recovery move is a motion to open the default under the Magistrate Court Rules, which is discretionary with the Magistrate; consider engaging an attorney immediately if you missed a Magistrate Court deadline.
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Frequently asked questions
How long do I have to respond to a debt collection lawsuit in Georgia?
You have 30 days from the date you were served to file your Answer in any Georgia trial-court tier. The governing statute depends on the tier shown on the case caption: Magistrate Court (cases up to $15,000, where most consumer-debt cases land) under O.C.G.A. § 15-10-43(a); State Court or Superior Court (cases above $15,000 or in counties without State Court) under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(a). The 30-day window is the same in both tracks; the statutes are different. State and Superior Court cases also get a § 9-11-55(a) 45-day filing window (30 days to file, plus additional 15-day window as a matter of right) — but § 9-11-55(a) is a Civil Practice Act rule and does NOT apply in Magistrate Court, so Magistrate-tier defendants face a hard 30-day deadline with no Civil-Practice-Act grace mechanism.
What is the statute of limitations on credit card debt in Georgia?
Georgia's statute of limitations on written contracts, including credit cards, is 6 years under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24. Open accounts may be subject to the 4-year SOL under § 9-3-25, and Georgia courts have applied the shorter period to some credit card cases framed as account stated. The clock typically runs from your last payment or last charge. Raise the SOL defense in your Answer.
Can I fight a debt buyer in Georgia without a lawyer?
Yes. Georgia Magistrate Court (cases up to $15,000) is designed for non-lawyers. File your Answer within 30 days under O.C.G.A. § 15-10-43(a) (Magistrate) or § 9-11-12(a) (State/Superior Court). A key Georgia proof issue: Nyankojo v. North Star Capital Acquisition, 298 Ga. App. 6 (2009), and Wirth v. CACH, LLC, 300 Ga. App. 488 (2009), require the assignment chain to identify your specific account by number — affidavits and generic bills of sale are insufficient. In State or Superior Court only (not Magistrate), § 9-11-55(a) gives you days 31–45 to open a default as a matter of right by filing and paying costs.
What defenses do I have against a debt buyer in Georgia?
Georgia has binding Court of Appeals decisions making it one of the strongest chain-of-title jurisdictions in the country. Nyankojo v. North Star Capital Acquisition, 298 Ga. App. 6 (2009), and Wirth v. CACH, LLC, 300 Ga. App. 488 (2009), both hold that assignment must be in writing, must identify both assignor and assignee, and must affirmatively link the specific account by account number. Affidavits alone are insufficient; bills of sale without account-level attachments are insufficient.
What happens if I ignore a debt collection lawsuit in Georgia?
If you miss the 30-day Answer deadline in State Court or Superior Court (Civil Practice Act tracks), O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a) gives you until day 45 from service — an additional 15-day window (days 31–45) — to open the default as a matter of right by filing your Answer and paying costs. No separate motion or showing of good cause is required. After that 15-day window closes, you must move under § 9-11-55(b) with providential cause or excusable neglect plus a meritorious defense, a much harder standard. In Magistrate Court, § 9-11-55 does NOT apply at all (the Civil Practice Act does not govern Magistrate Court); the 30-day deadline under § 15-10-43(a) is hard and default judgment can enter after Day 30 without a separate grace mechanism. Since most Georgia consumer-debt cases are in Magistrate Court (under the $15,000 cap), the 45-day-effective-window framing is a State/Superior feature, not a universal Georgia rule.
Does Georgia have any special protections for debt collection defendants?
Yes. Georgia has binding Georgia Court of Appeals precedent — Nyankojo v. North Star Capital Acquisition, 298 Ga. App. 6 (2009), and Wirth v. CACH, LLC, 300 Ga. App. 488 (2009) — requiring affirmative account-level identification in the assignment chain; this doctrine applies in all three trial-court tiers (Magistrate, State, Superior) and is the strongest published debt-buyer chain-of-title rule in the country. State Court and Superior Court cases also get the § 9-11-55(a) 45-day filing window — 30 days to file your Answer, with an additional 15-day window (days 31–45) to open default as a matter of right (most states treat default as final after the deadline; the GA Civil Practice Act tracks do not); this filing window does NOT apply in Magistrate Court, which uses § 15-10-43(a) and lacks the Civil Practice Act grace mechanism. If your credit card agreement has an arbitration clause, file the motion under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-1 et seq. WITH or BEFORE your Answer — the Tillman Group v. Keith, 201 Ga. App. 680 (1991), waiver rule is strict in all tiers.
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Enter the case basics from your summons. Answered drafts your filing-formatted Answerfirst, then lets you upload papers later for deeper proof issue scanning.
Common plaintiffs
The most active debt buyers and original creditors suing Georgia consumers right now. Each link goes to a state-specific defense guide for that plaintiff.
Crown Asset Management LLC
Privately-held debt buyer headquartered in Duluth, Georgia — the dominant Georgia-based plaintiff with significant in-state filing volume across Magistrate, State, and Superior Court tiers. Crown's in-state headquartering means many Georgia consumer-debt cases name Crown directly; the typical Georgia plaintiff's firm representing Crown is Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P.C., one of the largest debt-collection law firms in the Southeast. Hanna was the subject of a 2015 CFPB enforcement action — Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P.C. (N.D. Ga. 2015) — which resulted in a stipulated final judgment and order including a $3.1 million civil money penalty for filing collection lawsuits without meaningful attorney review and using affidavit-and-pleading templates that misrepresented the documentation actually supporting the claims. The Hanna findings are admissible in Georgia state-court proceedings as evidence of inadequate documentation patterns and improper-litigation conduct, and they strengthen any FDCPA counterclaim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e against Crown-Hanna filings. Crown's typical pleading template relies on portfolio-level bills of sale and custodian affidavits — exactly the pattern Nyankojo and Wirth treat as insufficient. The Crown blurb specifically: chain-of-title attacks at the Magistrate Court level under Nyankojo/Wirth, combined with the Hanna consent order as admissible-evidence support for FDCPA counterclaims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and § 1692f, produce strong defense leverage in most Crown filings.
LVNV Funding LLC
Privately-held; affiliated with Sherman Financial Group; serviced by Resurgent Capital Services, Inc. (Greenville, SC). LVNV is a Delaware LLC that holds debt on paper while Resurgent performs the collection servicing functions, and the typical multi-link corporate structure (Sherman Originator III → Sherman Acquisition → Resurgent → LVNV) compounds chain-of-title authentication burden under Nyankojo and Wirth — each link in the chain requires its own account-level documentation, and the probability that a complete chain can be produced declines with each step. Federal regulatory record relevant to Georgia defendants: the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's 2015 consent order against Sherman Financial Group affiliates (2015-CFPB-0021) imposed a $4.5 million civil money penalty for collecting on unverified debt and failing to provide required disclosures; the CFPB's 2022 consent order against Resurgent Capital Services ($1 million civil money penalty) addressed collection on debts consumers had disputed by submitting Identity Theft Reports. Both regulatory tracks are admissible in Georgia state-court proceedings as evidence of inadequate documentation patterns directly relevant to Nyankojo/Wirth chain-of-title attacks and to the parallel federal FDCPA counterclaim. LVNV files heavy in-state volume in Georgia; most LVNV pleadings use the same multi-link bill-of-sale template that Nyankojo/Wirth treats as insufficient.
Midland Credit Management
Encore Capital Group (NASDAQ:ECPG), publicly-traded, headquartered in San Diego. The largest US debt buyer by acquisition volume. Files in Georgia under both Midland Funding LLC (the holder entity) and Midland Credit Management (the servicer entity). Federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau enforcement against Encore Capital Group has produced two orders totaling approximately $67 million: In re Encore Capital Group, Inc., 2015-CFPB-0022 (Sept. 9, 2015) — $52 million ($42M consumer refunds + $10M civil penalty + $125M+ collection halt) — and CFPB v. Encore Capital Group (entered Oct. 16, 2020), Case No. 3:20-cv-01750 (S.D. Cal.) — $15 million civil penalty + $79,308.81 consumer redress, with findings of approximately 100 time-barred lawsuits and approximately 425,000 letters missing required disclosures. Separately, Georgia joined the December 2018 multistate Encore/Midland $6 million Assurance of Voluntary Compliance under then-Attorney General Chris Carr (one of 42 state AGs plus DC participating) — the AVC settles claims that Midland filed affidavits in state courts in large volumes without verifying the printed information (robo-signing), imposes a pre-filing account-documentation requirement on every Midland lawsuit, prohibits debt resale for two years, and allocates $25,000 per state for consumer compensation. Both regulatory tracks are admissible in Georgia state-court proceedings as evidence of inadequate documentation patterns directly relevant to Nyankojo/Wirth chain-of-title attacks and to FDCPA counterclaims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
Portfolio Recovery Associates
PRA Group, Inc. (NASDAQ:PRAA), publicly-traded, headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia. Together with Encore/Midland, one of the two largest US debt buyers by acquisition volume; heavy Georgia filing volume across Magistrate, State, and Superior Court tiers. Federal regulatory record: the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's 2015 consent order against Portfolio Recovery Associates (In re Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 2015-CFPB-0023, Sept. 9, 2015) imposed approximately $19 million in consumer redress plus an $8 million civil money penalty for collecting on debts the company could not verify, attempting to collect on time-barred debts without disclosing the SOL bar, and filing lawsuits based on inadequate documentation. PRA was also subject to a 2023 follow-up enforcement action resulting in a $24 million settlement for repeat conduct. Notably, the original 2015-CFPB-0023 order against PRA was paired with 2015-CFPB-0022 against Encore/Midland in the same enforcement wave — the CFPB targeted the two largest debt buyers in the United States simultaneously, finding parallel documentation and collection-conduct failures. The twin PRA consent orders are unusually strong admissible evidence against any active Georgia PRA filing because they document the exact documentation gaps Nyankojo and Wirth make dispositive at trial. Stack a Nyankojo/Wirth chain-of-title attack with a § 1692e FDCPA counterclaim citing the 2015 and 2023 PRA orders.
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